


Secret



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

State Dept. review completed

Secret

Nº 42

27 September 1971

Page Denied

SECRET

No. 0231/71
27 September 1971

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

COMMUNIST CHINA: Peking is outwardly calm, but other evidence points to a continuing leadership crisis. (Page 1)

USSR: Soviet leaders enlarge travel schedules. (Page 3)

YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Belgrade probably remains suspicious of Moscow. (Page 4)

USSR-UK: Moscow protests expulsion of agents. (Page 5)

NORTH VIETNAM - COMMUNIST CHINA: A high-level Chinese politburo delegation visits Hanoi. (Page 6)

BELGIUM: Prime minister forced to call early elections. (Page 7)

UN-DRUGS: Narcotics commission opens meeting. (Page 9)

UN-AFRICA: Security Council meets on South-West Africa. (Page 11)

INDIA-USSR-PAKISTAN: Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Moscow (Page 13)

CAMBODIA: Attack on US personnel (Page 13)

JAPAN: Raid on palace grounds (Page 14)

SECRET

SECRET

COMMUNIST CHINA: Eyewitnesses report that outward calm prevails in Peking, but other unusual developments suggest that the leadership crisis is unresolved.

Press reports state that preparations for low-key celebrations of National Day on 1 October are going forward in the parks of Peking, and also that Canton television will carry a "special and important" newscast tomorrow night about the "circumstances" of the National Day commemoration. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED] There is no heightened military presence in the capital nor any sign that the Peking garrison troops are on alert status.

Despite the air of calm in Peking, behind-the-scenes tension within the ruling politburo apparently remains high. Three military leaders on the politburo were in the party that saw Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien off when he departed for Hanoi, but other top-ranking military figures, including army chief of staff Huang Yung-sheng and air force commander Wu Fa-hsien, have been out of public view since the major leadership meeting convened on 12 September.

There is no new information on Mao Tse-tung's health, but a recent report concerning heir-designate Lin Piao suggests that uncertainty over Lin's physical condition, or perhaps his future political role, may be a crucial factor in the current leadership crisis. This impression has been reinforced by the refusal of the Chinese ambassador in Ottawa, Huang Hua, to comment on rumors concerning Lin during a conversation with a Canadian foreign affairs officer on 23 September. Huang, who appeared tense, pointedly dodged two direct queries on Lin's health and answered the second query by saying that Mao's health was excellent when Huang last saw him. Huang left

27 Sep 71

Central Intelligence Bulletin

1

SECRET

SECRET

Peking for his Canadian post in the middle of July.

25X1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the traditional National Day holiday banquet hosted by Premier Chou En-lai would be held as scheduled on 30 September. This event may not shed any further light on Mao or Lin's status, because neither usually attends the banquet. Although the decision to hold this affair probably is intended to convey an impression of normalcy, Peking's postponement of other scheduled activities suggests that the regime anticipates no early resolution of the leadership crisis. A statement by Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials [REDACTED] that all foreign businessmen have been instructed "to depart China" may be an indication that the regime also is planning to postpone or cancel the Canton Trade Fair, scheduled to open on 15 October. [REDACTED]

25X1

27 Sep 71

Central Intelligence Bulletin

2

SECRET

SECRET

USSR: The top three Soviet leaders are continuing to add new destinations to their already crowded fall itineraries.

General Secretary Brezhnev, following his visit to Yugoslavia, unexpectedly flew to Budapest to brief Hungarian leaders on his talks with President Tito. He arrived in Sofia on Sunday to make a similar report to Bulgarian officials.

Premier Kosygin reportedly has added Morocco to his October schedule, possibly between his projected visit to Algeria and his 17-27 October trip to Canada. The US Embassy in Ottawa has received a number of hints that Kosygin may be interested in a visit to the UN and perhaps meetings with the "highest" US officials during or after his Canadian stay. The Soviets have already asked the Canadians if they would be "unhappy" if Kosygin were to visit the UN after leaving Canada.

Finally, TASS has announced that President Podgorny will visit India and Burma on his way to Hanoi. He is scheduled to stop in New Delhi on 1 October and proceed to Rangoon the next day.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev's talks with President Tito last week produced a statement of intent to improve relations but probably did not allay Yugoslav suspicions of Soviet intentions.

The joint statement signed on Saturday calls generally for increased party, government, and economic cooperation. Belgrade, however, will watch closely for follow-through on promises of the Soviets to soften their critical attitudes toward Yugoslavia's experiments in political and economic reform, to pursue reciprocity in information agreements, and to help ease tensions in the Balkans. On the latter point, Brezhnev agreed that a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans "could be" a means of stabilizing peace in the area. This position still falls short of Yugoslav and Romanian demands for a renunciation of the use of force in the Balkans.

The agreement mentioned the 1955 Belgrade and 1956 Moscow declarations which guaranteed Yugoslav party and government independence, but the agreement did not specifically satisfy Tito's desire for a clear-cut Soviet hands-off policy toward his country. Throughout the visit, there were indications of Yugoslav uneasiness over Brezhnev's ambiguity on Yugoslav sovereignty and the Brezhnev doctrine. The face-to-face talks last Thursday and Friday reportedly were difficult and Brezhnev abused protocol several times by keeping Tito waiting. The final communiqué was cool, mentioning only an exchange of views on a wide range of problems.

After his departure Saturday, Brezhnev flew to Budapest and on Sunday to Sofia, where he probably briefed local leaders on the effects of the joint agreement on their special interests in relation with Yugoslavia. Each of these countries has figured prominently in the pressures on Yugoslavia this past summer.



25X11

SECRET

SECRET

USSR-UK: Moscow has reacted to London's expulsion of 105 Soviet citizens for espionage with a predictable protest of outraged innocence and threats of retaliation.

In a statement presented to the British ambassador in Moscow yesterday, the Soviet Foreign Ministry officially protested the British action, branding it as "groundless" and "fabricated." The statement further declared that the expulsions were the latest manifestation of Britain's policy of creating obstacles to detente, particularly in European affairs. It also charged that the move was an attempt to cover up activities by British "special services" against the USSR, including Soviet institutions and personnel in Britain.

The Foreign Ministry statement warned that if the British measures are left in force, the USSR "will have nothing to do but take corresponding measures of reply." TASS meanwhile is quoting British press reports that the ouster "may entail very serious consequences for London." In the past, the expulsion of Russians for espionage has led to retribution in kind; however, the magnitude of the British move and the possibility of further expulsions elsewhere in the West may temporarily stay Moscow's hand--though probably not its public media.

The thrust of Moscow's reaction seems as much directed against the timing and politics of the British action as it is at denying the charges. The expulsions may at least temporarily set back current Soviet diplomatic initiatives in Western Europe, the Conference on European Security in particular.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

NORTH VIETNAM - COMMUNIST CHINA: The current visit to Hanoi by a high-level Chinese politburo delegation, although billed as a routine aid mission, appears to have an essentially political purpose.

The Chinese initiative itself--sending politburo member Li Hsien-nien and his aid team to Hanoi rather than having the Vietnamese come hat-in-hand to Peking--suggests that more than the annual aid protocol is involved.

In terms of timing it comes shortly before the scheduled visit to Hanoi of Soviet President Podgorny. The Vietnamese are responding enthusiastically, referring to the delegation as one of "friendship," comparing it to Chou En-lai's visit last March, and are highlighting Chinese support for Hanoi's war aims rather than Peking's material aid. The tenor of Li's banquet speech on 24 September is especially pleasing to Hanoi ears. He engaged in the kind of harsh denunciation of US motives that Hanoi is currently using, characterizing US imperialism as the "most ferocious enemy of our times" and criticizing the Nixon administration for making "noises about a peaceful settlement while continuing its war of aggression" in Indochina. Li also offered unqualified support for Hanoi's negotiating posture and reassured the Vietnamese that the destiny of Indochina would indeed be decided by the "peoples of the three Indochinese countries."

The Li visit appears to be another Chinese effort to assuage Vietnamese anxieties generated by the announcement that President Nixon had been invited to Peking. For about a month thereafter, Hanoi engaged in unprecedented polemical lecturing of the Chinese, accusing them of consorting with the enemy, abandoning friends, and not being true revolutionaries. These attacks stopped on 22 August as suddenly as they had begun, and by mid-September the Vietnamese were deliberately avoiding public criticism of Peking. Hanoi press media, for example, edited out the anti-Chinese comments of a visiting Japanese Communist delegation. The Li visit thus restores, at least for public purposes, the image of Peking-Hanoi solidarity unmarred by any Vietnamese apprehensions over any possible Chinese effort to mediate the Vietnam war in talks with the US.

25X11

27 Sep 71

Central Intelligence Bulletin

6

SECRET

BELGIUM: Strife within the Socialist and Social Christian coalition parties has forced Prime Minister Eyskens to call national elections for 7 November, seven months ahead of schedule.

With only two weeks before the reconvention of parliament, the government agreed to dissolve both chambers. To assure governmental continuity during the electoral campaign, the cabinet will resign only upon the formation of a new cabinet after the elections.

Eyskens blames the international monetary situation and an expected billion-dollar deficit in the country's 1972 budget for the current political crisis. Actually, the approaching electoral deadline had accelerated the centrifugal forces within the coalition.

Eyskens, leader of the Social Christians, was unable to maintain order within his own party. The Flemish faction, backed by the Flemish press, had previously indicated an unwillingness to act this fall upon the legislation most desired by the Socialists--a cultural pact, the institution of regional economic bodies, and a bill resolving the disputed situation in six bilingual communes along the country's linguistic frontier. In early July, Eyskens had promised these provisions to the Socialists and the opposition Liberals in return for their support of his program for constitutional revision. The government's existence largely depended on the fulfillment of this bargain.

The politically confident Walloon (French-speaking) Socialists, led by party co-president Leburton, have been eager to test their strength before the holiday season. More specifically, competition between Leburton and the current vice-premier, Andre Cools, for the position of prime minister has propelled the party in this direction. The intensely ambitious Leburton, to further his

SECRET

political future, has criticized party compromises with the Social Christians on the recent implementation of constitutional revision and cultural autonomy. On the very eve of a top-level intercoalition meeting, his inflammatory remarks about the Social Christians precipitated the crisis.

25X1

27 Sep 71

Central Intelligence Bulletin

8

SECRET

SECRET

UN-DRUGS: Deterrents to international trafficking in drugs will provide the focus for the four-week meeting opening today in Geneva of the UN's Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND).

The CND, a subsidiary of the Economic and Social Council, is expected to pay considerable attention to US-suggested amendments to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The basic thrust of these proposed amendments is to give the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) mandatory powers in areas where it currently can only request voluntary compliance. A number of countries have expressed reservations, maintaining that the measures would constitute a significant infringement on their sovereignty. They appear to have special concern over the proposal that the INCB be able to impose a narcotics embargo against nations incapable of preventing major illicit activity. A high-level diplomatic conference set for March 1972 will review and take final action on the suggested amendments.

The recently completed draft convention on psychotropic (mind-bending) substances complements the 1961 legislation by identifying 32 chemical-origin drugs not regulated a decade ago that are regarded by the international community as dangerous today. The most notorious example in this category is LSD. The commission is likely to seek more ratifications--a total of 40 are needed--to the new convention in the hope that it can enter into force soon. Most observers believe that will occur during the first half of 1972. There has been some concern, however, that international controls over the psychotropic substances will be inadequate--weaker than US suggestions for amending the 1961 convention. The less developed countries, primary producers of the "natural" drugs regulated by the 1961 convention, maintain that the new legislation affects less harshly the developed nations, in which most psychotropics are manufactured.

(continued)

27 Sep 71


Central Intelligence Bulletin

9

SECRET

SECRET

The CND is certain to seek more backing for the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control. The fund was set up in March and has received its major impetus to date from a US gift of \$1 million, with an additional \$1 million pledged by Washington. It is expected to be used to expand greatly the drug-control efforts of the UN's specialized agencies, especially the Food and Agricultural Organization, which is developing economic alternatives to illicit opium production.



25X11

27 Sep 71

Central Intelligence Bulletin

10

SECRET

SECRET

UN-AFRICA: Today's special Security Council meeting on South-West Africa could prove to be highly contentious.

Impetus for this session was provided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in June, when it issued an advisory opinion upholding the 1966 decision of the General Assembly to terminate South Africa's mandate over the territory. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is pressing for UN action in the wake of the ICJ's ruling and has called the Council meeting at this particular time in order to share the spotlight with--and compel the attention of--the high-level representatives of the major powers who will be on hand in New York. The delegation from the OAU consists of its chairman, Mauritanian President Ould Daddah, and several foreign ministers.

Ould Daddah delivered an acerbic speech against the Western powers on Friday, and more of the same may be in store today. A draft report on South-West Africa will be submitted to the Council by its ad hoc committee on the territory, despite the lack of agreement on some sections in the text. The Africans are likely to focus on the unresolved points, which include a call for UN sanctions against Pretoria should it--as is certain--refuse to withdraw from South-West Africa. Another critical issue on which no agreement was reached in committee involves interpretation of the Council's embargo on arms supplies to South Africa. The Africans have not, however, given any sign that they will push for South Africa's expulsion from UN membership.

The Council session on South-West Africa, combined with the planned high-level OAU mission to Western Europe next month, is indicative of the Africans' desire to obtain some kind of satisfaction on "colonial" subjects, which also involve apartheid in South Africa and the other white redoubts of Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. Among these

27 Sep 71

Central Intelligence Bulletin

11

SECRET

SECRET

the one likely to engender the biggest squabble in the Assembly this fall is the African bid to have spokesmen of the liberation movement designated to represent the Portuguese territories in the Addis Ababa - based UN Economic Commission for Africa. All moves to delay the issue have failed so far, and the Africans may well have the votes to secure the designations they desire. If successful, this tactic could lead to similar efforts on behalf of liberation movements elsewhere.

25X1

25X1

27 Sep 71

Central Intelligence Bulletin

12

SECRET

SECRET

NOTES

INDIA-USSR-PAKISTAN: Mrs. Gandhi's brief visit to Moscow, scheduled to begin today, is expected to be devoted largely to discussions regarding East Pakistan. Indicative of the likely subject matter was the arrival in Moscow on 23 September of D. P. Dhar, an official of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs who has been closely associated with formulation of India's policy toward Bangla Desh. Mrs. Gandhi, in her talks with Soviet leaders, presumably will be seeking further commitments of diplomatic, economic, and possibly military support, pointing out that domestic pressure on her government to "do something" regarding East Pakistan remains high. Bengali refugees--now numbering over nine million, according to Indian sources--continue to stream across the border. The Soviets, however, are likely to urge caution on the Indians, as they apparently have done on more than one occasion since the crisis erupted in South Asia last March. [REDACTED]

25X1

* * * *

CAMBODIA: The attack on US Mission personnel in Phnom Penh yesterday is the most serious incident so far in the Communists' terrorist campaign against the US presence in the capital. Two Americans were killed and another ten wounded at a recreation center near the embassy by explosives apparently thrown by motorcyclists. Earlier this month there were an abortive attack on the US ambassador and several unsuccessful attempts on other US Embassy and military personnel in Phnom Penh. Enemy elements in areas just north and northeast of Phnom Penh have recently become bolder and they may be responsible for the recent attacks in the capital. [REDACTED]

25X1

(continued)

27 Sep 71

Central Intelligence Bulletin

13

SECRET

SECRET

JAPAN: The raid by a handful of radical students into the grounds of Emperor Hirohito's palace on 25 September is the latest example of a new student willingness to engage in terrorist acts that fly in the face of popular Japanese attitudes. In other recent incidents extremist youth groups have inflicted on police forces numerous casualties and, at the Narita airport disturbances, three deaths. The police are concerned that several of the larger youth groups are now forsaking their traditional ritualistic protests in favor of extremist activity involving lethal weapons. They are also concerned that the use of such tactics during the mass demonstrations expected after the Diet convenes in mid-October could lead to widespread violence. Such a development could readily compound the Sato government's anticipated difficulties with the Diet over the Okinawa treaty and relations with China. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

25X1
25X1

27 Sep 71

Central Intelligence Bulletin

14

SECRET

Secret

Secret